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Abstract.- In this report we describe the radiological and access control systems in GANIL. These systems 
are based on microprocessors use, which are connected to a MITRA 125 computer. The latter centrali~es in-
formations coming from the whole radiation-protection system, displays them on a board screen and registers 
necessary information in order to keep the log-book (a diary). 
I. Introduction.- The accelerated and lost ions on the 
beam lines, injection and ejection systems, slits, beam 
stop etc ... produce by means of nuclear reactions secon-
daries radiations of varying kinds and energies with a 
predominance of neutronic radiation. These nuclear reac-
tions create radionuclides in all these materials ele-
ments where there has been a loss. In this way, a resi-
dual gamma radiation remains when the accelerator is at 
a halt. The rates of neutron production by interaction 
of heavy ions with matter are known experimentally for 
energies not exceeding 10 MeV/A (I). Recent theoretical 
calculations are available for energies of 40 MeV/A and 
100 MeV/A. They give the number, angular distribution 
and the spectrum of neutrons produced (2.3). Using this 
data, it has been possible to calculate the thickness 
of biological shields to reduce the dose-equivalent ra-
tes to as low as possible outside these shields. In any 
case, of course, these doses will not exceed the legal 
limits (4). Recent data, obtained with the CERN SC ex-
ternal 12C ion beam (86 MeV/A) has confirmed the assump-
tions (5.5.7). Once the heavy shield has been fixed, 
we must control directly and permanently the dose-equi-
valent rate in every radiation area by installing a 
complete detection network and also control access to 
the prohibited zones by means of safety and access con-
trol systems. 
We are elaborating on these two points in this paper. 
2. Part I : Radiation control.- In these areas wherewe 
wish to supervise the exposure level, there are moni-
tors which convert into electrical data the gamma and 
neutron radiation or the gazeous atmospheric contamina-
tion. The monitor transmits this information in the 
form of standardized impulses, to a data processing u-
nit equipped with a microprocessor. This data processing 
unit calculates the exposure level, compares it to dif-
ferent thresholds and produces a coded alarm. This code 
is processed by a signalling box placed near the moni-
tor. The data processing unit communicates with the cen-
tral computer MITRA 125 belonging to the radioprotec-
tion service. This computer memorizes the data, displays 
it on three screens and records it in a logbook. 
The layout of radiation control is given on fig 
A.1. The monitor and its signal11ng box. 
Each monitor comprises a detector appropriate to 
the radiation to be measured and an electronic unit. 
Near the monit'or, there is a signalling box. The two 
combined (monitor plus signalling box) form a beacon. 
The latter is fitted on a trolley (the location of beam 
loss can be changed later on and the experimental areas 
modified) and the beacon and data processing unit are 
connected by means of a cable through a multidirectional 
connecting box. The installation will thus contain 104 
measuring circuits spread over the different areas bet-
ween 42 connecting boxes and 76 beacons. Three kinds of 
beacon are used as follows : 
beacons for neutron radiation control 41 
- beacons for gamma radiation control 33 
beacons for gazeous atmospheric 
contamination control 2 
The detector's characteristics are as follows: 
+ Neutron detector : 3He- proportionnal counter fit-
ted i~t;-a-T~5-~;-thick polyethylene sphere. A source 
made of a Th-w spiral wire and located in the base of 
thE counter ensures a constant check on the functionning 
of the monitor. 
+ Gamma detector : Cylindrical ionization chamber 
with ~~~t~a~~l~~t~ode, filled with air at atmospheric 
pressure. The chamber cavity has a tiss~e-equivalent 
thickness of 300 mg/cm 2 • AIS7CS source ensures a cons-
tant check on the functionning of the monitor. It is lo-
cated near the chamber in order to give an average equi-
valent-dose rate of 50 wrem/h. 
+ AtmosEheric contamination detector: The monitor 
commo~ly-~al~d-diff~re~tIal-i;~i~atIo~ chamber is made 
of two counters of equal volume connected in electrical 
opposition so that the resultant current measures the 
volumic activity in the air-flow chamber, the external 
ambient radiation being compensated by the other chamber. 
A 137CS source ensures a constant check on the function-
ning of the monitor. 
The electronic unit connected to the detectors consists 
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of 
+ a B.T. stabilized power supply 
+ a H.T. stabilized power supply 
+ an amplifier with pulse amplitude discriminator 
+ an adjustable pulse divider 
+ a pulse shapero 
The electronic unit produces standard pulses of 20V-
2ws whose frequency changes according to the equivalent 
dose rate, each pulse representing a dose-quantum (IW 
rem). The signalling box is connected to the monitor 
to form a beacon. It is fed from the electrical grid 
by means of the connecting box and feeds the monitor. 
On the front panel are four lights and an audio-alarm 
with adjustable frequency and intensity. The warning 
signs are standardized in accordance with law. 
B.l. The data processing unit. 
Each monitor is connected by means of the connecting 
box to a data processing unit equipped with a 1M 6100 
Intersi 1 m.icroprocessor. The latter processes the pulse 
emitted by the monitor and sends a coded alarm to the 
signalling box. The activity level is estimated on the 
basis of a 3-second period. A coefficient K selected on 
thumbwheels allows the proximity factor to be taken in-
to account. In the same way, the SI,S2,S3 thresholds 
corresponding to the different alarm thresholds are al-
so selected on thumbwheels. In order to avoid the a-
larms being set in motion without due cause, every 
threshold is equipped with a prograooned hysteresis. 
The data processing units are grouped in two places of 
the electronic gallery and in two places in the galle-
ries of the experimental areas. A special rack connect 
24 data processing units and the MITRA 125 central com-
puter. Thus every 3 seconds and for every monitor, the 
following are sent to the MITRA 125. 
- I ts address 
The risk level 
- 111e states of the thresholds 
- Data concerning the state of each monitor and ~n 
particular : 
monitor fault 
signalling system fault 
monitor being tested 
transmission fault. 
A pulse generator enables the smooth running both of 
circuits and connections and of processing prograoones 
to be checked periodically. 
C.l. The central computer., 
In order to standardize with the computers supervising 
the functionning of the accelerators, the central com-
puter is a MITRA 125 which ensures, with regard to the 
radiation control, a certain number of functions of 
which the mains are given below : 
- Reception of the monitor data coming from the 
data processing unit through the special rack. 
- Processing of the states of the thresholds and 
monitors to maintain the display screens up-to-date 
and to record the logbooks. 
- Evaluation of the accumulated doses for different 
periods of time. 
- Management of the three display screens and of 
one synoptic. 
Management and processing of the logbooks. 
- Management of the control board. 
- Recording of all monitors during 24 hours of the 
exposure level and possibility to display on a memOsco-
pe. 
The three ADM 3A LEAR SIEGLER display screen are used. 
- To display the time and the data and as well any 
request from the operator. 
- To display the synoptic of the risk level for 
every monitor. 
The outline on the screen, in the normal display posi-
tion, is as follows (in two identical columns) 
:I: Indicator of the access stiLe of the room 
:I: Identification of the monitor 
:I: State of the monitor 
:I: Exposure level in m remlh 
:I: Graphic representation of exposure level. 
If one of the screens fails, the operator can, through 
the keyboard, concentrate the contents of the three 
screens on only two screens creating three columns on 
each screen and suppressing the graphic representation. 
The computer records on typewriter any changes in the 
system and any situations requested by the operator. 
The recorded messages are classified into three catego-
ries : 
a) Messages concerning events and in particular : 




intervention concerning the thresholds or K 
through the thumbwheels. 
b) Messages in reply to requests from operator,e.g. 
. switching a beacon on or off 
. list of the beacons whose exposure level lies bet-
ween the thresholds SI, S2 , etc ... 
list of non functionning beacons. 
c) Cyclical messages appearing at set times to indi-
cate the beacon's average cum'Jlated levels. 
As we have seen, the MITRA 125 acts as a memory, while 
the processing of monitor data and alarms is carried out 
on the spot. In the event of the computer breaking down, 
part of the data remains available locally through the 
data processing units. 
3. Safety devices and control of accesS Lo controlled 
areas in GANIL.-
A. Safety devices. 
The main functions of these devices are : 
- to ensure that a room does not receive a beam while 
it is accessible (with or without control of staff move-
ments whether access to the room is restricted or free). 
- to check that nobody remains in a room into which 
a beam is to be passed. 
- to refuse access to a room where the beam is pas-
sing. 
The layout of access controls is given on Fig. 2. 
BUM SECU~ITln '! UDIOlOGIUl SfCURlTY 
/I ACCfSSSAS /I 8EA"" TRANSPORT 
'------r--'-"-.~'":;;---t------': ~ 
Fig. 2: The layout of access controls. 
The safety devices are as follows. 
a) the "Beam" safety devices. 
In the case of rooms containing injectors, two out of 
three of the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
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No H.F. accelerator electric field 
Electrostatic ejection deflector unconnected 
Ion source switched off 
For the others rooms, the two following conditions must 
be fulfilled: 
. the "beams top" situated up-stream of the room must 
be in place. 
. the deviation magnet which normally sends the beam 
into the appropriate room and is situated just beyond 
the "beams top" must not be connected. 
b) The ambient radiological safety devices. We 
check that, for a room's gamma and neutron detectors, 
the" smooth running" threshold given by the internal 
source is reached and that the equivalent-dose rate does 
not exceed the threshold S2' 
c) the" Access" safety devices 
This concerns : automatic control of staff movement in 
the controlled access zones. 
- checking that the different entry points of a room 
are closed and locked. 
- checking that no room's emergency halt mechanism 
is on. 
For a given room, the all safety conditions are resu-
med by a state called "Pret SPR". This state means that 
all safety conditions are effectively fulfilled. The 
absence of this state for any room signifies that a 
fault has occured or that one of the conditions has not 
been fulfi lled. 
B. Access Control. 
As a general rule, there is only one entry to the dif-
ferent rooms comprising the controlled area. This entry 
is fitted with an access control system (SCA). However, 
there are several possible access points to the rooms 
where the SSCI and SSC2 accelerators are situated. The 
SSCI has 5, 2 of which will be equipped with an access 
control system; the SSC2 has 3 , only one of which will 
be equipped with the access control system. 
The other entries to these 2 rooms are equipped with 
conventional doors fitted with electrical closing devi-
ces and are only used when free access is permitted. 
All entries are fitted with light signals indicating 
the state of access to the room. For safety reasons, all 
the exits are unobstructed (anti-panic bar). Only these 
entries equipped with an SCA device are used when the 
accelerator is operating. A room's SCA prevents entry 
when access is forbiden(Inviolability) and only allows 
one person to enter at a time when access is controlled. 
In this case both the beam security and ambient radio-
logical security conditions must be fulfilled. Staff 
movement is then checked by means of personal badges. 
The actual access takes the form of a chamber 2.5 m 
long and 1.3 m wide. It is equipped at each end with a 
swivelling door with an automatic closing system and a 
badge decoder. The floor of the chamber is covered with 
a contact mat which detects when a person passes or is 
present. In the middle of the chamber, there is a se-
cond contact mat independant of the first one and which 
can only hold one person. The requirement "only one per-
son in the chamber at a time" is fulfilled when there 
is : "0" on the main contact mat 
"1" on the small contact mat. 
We can now describe the access procedure once the secu-
rity conditions have been fulfilled. The person pre-
sents himself at the entrance of the chamber and is i-
dentified by introducing his badge into the decoder. 
The door opens and the person may enter the chamber . 
The door closes. The person walks onto the small con-
tact mat. If the requirement "Only one person in the 
chamber at the time" is checked, the person may relea-
se the chamber's second door by pressing on the appro-
priate push-button. He may then enter the controlled 
zone. 
The passage is then taken into account. The door auto-
matically closes and is ready to allow another person 
to pass through. 
All the security andaccess control for any room is pro-
cessed on the spot by a microprocessor (8080A ). 
The central computer MITRA 125 is kept informed both of 
the positions of the various safety devices and all per-
sons passing through. It also maintains a list of per-
sons entitled to enter the controlled areas, prints a 
logbook giving all changes in state, each passage through 
the chamber and responses to an operator's questions etc. 
Furthermore it controls a colour screen which give to 
the SPR operator all informations pertinent to the sta-
te of the rooms, the beam security, the emergency halts, 
failures, etc ... 
The accelerators building will accomodate the complete 
radiation control and access control systems during the 
last quarter of 1981 and should be operationnal for the 
first tests in SSCI. 
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